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Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance
ABSTRACT
Americans drive 2,360,000,000,000 miles each year, far outstripping other nations. Every
time a driver takes to the road, and with each mile she drives, she exposes herself and others
to the risk of accident. Insurance premiums are only weakly linked to mileage, however,
and have largely lump-sum characteristics. The result is too much driving and too many
accidents. This paper begins by developing a model of the relationship between driving and
accidents that formalizes Vickrey’s [1968] central insights about the accident externalities of
driving. We use this model to estimate the driving, accident, and congestion reductions that
could be expected from switching to other insurance pricing systems. Under a competitive
system of per-mile premiums, in which insurance companies quote risk-classi…ed per-mile
rates, we estimate that the reduction in insured accident costs net of lost driving bene…ts
would be $9.8 -$12.7 billion nationally, or $58-$75 per insured vehicle. When uninsured
accident cost savings and congestion reductions are considered, the net bene…ts rise to
$25-$29 billion, exclusive of monitoring costs. The total bene…ts of a uniform per-gallon
insurance charge could be $1.3-$2.3 billion less due to heterogeneity in fuel e¢ciency. The
total bene…ts of “optimal” per-mile premiums in which premiums are taxed to account
for accident externalities would be $32-$43 billion, or $187-$254 per vehicle, exclusive of
monitoring costs. One reason that insurance companies may not have switched to per-mile
premiums on their own is that most of the bene…ts are external and the transaction costs
to the company and its customers of checking odometers could exceed the $31 per vehicle
of gains that a single company could temporarily realize on its existing base of customers.3
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...the manner in which [auto insurance] premiums are computed and paid fails miserably
to bring home to the automobile user the costs he imposes in a manner that will appropriately
in‡uence his decisions.
– William Vickrey
Americans drive 2,360,000,000,000 miles each year, far outstripping other nations.1 The
cost of auto accidents is commensurately large: 42,000 fatalities,2 roughly $100 billion
in accident insurance,3 and according to the Urban Institute [1991] over $250 billion in
uninsured accident costs per year.
Every time a driver takes to the road, and with each mile she drives, she exposes herself
and others to the risk of accident. An optimal tort and insurance system would charge
people the full social cost of this risk exposure on the marginal mile of driving. Otherwise,
they will drive too much and cause too many accidents. Unfortunately, neither the tort
nor insurance system comes close to optimality. More unfortunate still, the cost of their
shortfalls is not just too many accidents, but is compounded by the extra congestion and
pollution that over driving causes.
The shortfall of the insurance system is that premiums are only weakly linked to mileage,
so that they have largely lump-sum characteristics. Although premiums do depend upon
statements about mileage, the mileage classi…cations are coarse, low-mileage discounts are
extremely modest and these mileage …gures are self-reported estimates of future mileage
with no implicit or explicit commitment.4 Few drivers therefore pay or perceive a signi…cant
1See table No. 1030, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Figure for 1994.
2See table No. 1020, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997. Figure for 1995.
3After subtracting comprehensive insurance coverage, the remaining premiums for private passenger
vehicles totaled $84 billion in 1995. State Average Expenditures and Premiums for Personal Automobile
Insurance in 1995, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Jan. 1997. Commercial premiums are
approximately 15 percent of premiums for private passenger vehicles. The Insurance Information Institute
1998 Fact Book, p. 22.
4For example, State Farm distinguishes drivers based upon whether they report an estimated annual
mileage of under or over 7500 miles. Drivers who estimate annual mileages of under 7500 miles receive 15%
discounts (5% in Massachusetts). The 15% discount is modest given that those who drive less than 7500
miles per year drive an average of 3600 miles compared to 13,000 miles for those who drive over 7500 per
year, according to the 1994 Residential Transportation Energy Consumption Survey of the Department of
Energy. The implied elasticity of accident costs with respect to miles is :05, an order of magnitude below2
insurance cost from driving an extra mile, despite the substantial accident costs involved.
Drivers would pay closer to the marginal social cost of their activity if insurance com-
panies quoted premiums at x cents per-mile, where x varied to re‡ect the per-mile risk and
could depend upon territory, driver age, safety record or other relevant characteristics used
today. Such per-mile premiums are advocated by Litman [1997], Butler [1990], and the
National Organization for Women [1998], and are currently charged for some commercial
insurance.5 Even a system of per-mile premiums would not, however, come close to the
optimal accident charge.
The shortfall of the tort system is its failure to impose su¢cient liability to promote
e¢cient behavior. As a result, insurance premiums are less than the marginal accident cost
of driving, whether the cost is measured as the cost of a marginal driver as it should be
under a system of lump-sum premiums or as the cost of a marginal mile as it should be under
per-mile premiums. The shortfall arises because a driver is not always held responsible for
the damages he causes. Liability hinges on negligence, so a driver only pays for the risk he
imposes on others to the extent that he is negligent and they are not. (Liability is even
less frequently imposed in no-fault states). Yet as Vickrey observed, if two drivers get into
an accident, even the safer driver is typically a “but for” cause of the accident in the sense
that had she opted for the metro, the accident would not have occurred.6
what the evidence suggests is the private or social elasticity of accident costs. The link between driving and
premiums may be attenuated in part because there is signi…cant noise in self-reported estimates of future
mileage, estimates whose accuracy does not a¤ect insurance pay-outs.
Insurance companies also classify based upon the distance of a commute to work. These categories are also
coarse, however. State Farm, for example, classi…es cars based upon whether they are used for commuting
less than 20 miles per week, in between 20 and 100 miles per week, or over 100 miles per week.
5For private and public livery, taxicabs, and buses, because “rates are high and because there is no risk
when the car is not in operation, a system of rating has been devised on an earnings basis per $100 of gross
receipts or on a mileage basis." Bickelhaupt [1983, p. 613]. For details on per-mile commercial insurance, see
“Commercial Automobile Supplementary Rating Procedures," Insurance Services O¢ce, on …le with author.
6Sometimes, of course, only one of the drivers causes the accident such as when a driver plows into a
long line of cars. If one car wasn’t there to absorb the impact, another would have, so the cars that are hit
do not cause the accident in any respect. Such accident substitution is not accounted for by the theoretical
model we present, and reduces the externalities from driving. This substitution e¤ect is, however, accounted
for by our regression results.3
For e¢cient incentives, both drivers should therefore pay the full cost of two-car ac-
cidents, regardless of negligence.7 (See Green, 1976, for the general proposition.) Such a
system of “double strict liability” would give both drivers the proper incentives to limit
their driving and also to drive carefully, incentives that account for the “Vickrey” external-
ity of driving.8 The negligence system, in contrast, can make people drive safely, managing
the caretaking externality, but does not induce them to drive less, managing the quantity
externality (see Cooter and Ulen, 1988, and more generally Shavell, 1980).
A simple remedy for this situation— one that avoids the accident reporting problem
of double strict liability— would be to tax insurance premiums enough so that a driver
pays the expected value of injuries to both herself and others. If premiums remain lump
sum, such a tax would make drivers pay the full social cost of having an extra driver on
the roads when considering whether to buy a car. The premium tax would also speed
the day when insurance companies decide that transaction costs are low enough to justify
switching to per-mile premiums, because a premium tax would increase the joint gains of
the insurance company and its customers from reducing driving, accidents, and premiums.
Once premiums are per-mile, the tax would ensure that drivers paid the full marginal
accident cost from their driving.
Vickrey (1968), Sugarman (1993), Tobias (1993) and others have all advocated creating
7Ignoring the incentive compatibility problem in reporting accidents, double strict liability could be
implemented in a world without insurance by …ning each driver for the damages she causes other drivers. If
the government keeps the proceeds from …nes, then each driver will bear the full accident costs, su¤ering her
own damages and paying a …ne equal to the damages of others. Accident would not, however, be reported
frequently under such a system, which lead Green [1976] to dismiss the possibility of making all involved
parties pay the full cost of accidents and motivated him to search for second best policies.
8One might worry that since such a system does not depend on fault, people would drive more carelessly
as many argue they do under a system of no-fault. (See, e.g., Devlin, 1992, for some evidence that no-fault
could reduce care; see Dewees, Du¤, and Trebilcock [1996, pp. 22-26] for a review of the empirical literature
on no-fault.) However, like a tort system, a system of double strict liability would provide optimal caretaking
incentives, absent insurance, because the cost to a driver of getting into an accident is the full cost to both
herself and others. She therefore receives the full bene…ts of caretaking to the extent that taking care reduces
the frequency of accidents. If a driver were insured, under a system of double strict liability, this insurance
would limit caretaking incentives in just the same way that it does under a tort system. Experience rating
would, however, work to partially restore these incentives just as it does under a tort system (at the usual
expense in a principal-agent framework of shifting risk back from the insurance companies to drivers).4
a closer link between driving and premiums by selling insurance with gasoline.9 The idea of
charging a uniform per-gallon surcharge on gasoline to fund part or all of the compensation
for auto accidents has come to be called “Pay at the Pump,” and is well-surveyed in most
of its variants by Wenzel [1995]. (In some variants, the surcharge would vary by territory).
One virtue of these plans is that they limit or eliminate the uninsured motorist problem
because gasoline can’t be purchased without buying insurance. However, pay-at-the-pump
plans could also limit caretaking incentives because the per-gallon fee does not vary with
driving record; and, when lump sum fees are charged for bad safety records as Sugarman
[1993] proposes, this limits the resulting driving reductions by lowering the marginal charge.
Another fault of these plans is that a uniform per-gallon charge is a blunt pricing instrument
to reduce the accidents from driving. Such pricing does not take account of the fact that
per-gallon risk will depend upon the driver, territory, and the fuel e¢ciency of the vehicle (a
car that gets good gasoline mileage can drive many miles on a gallon of gas). This creates
an ine¢ciency because bad drivers in dangerous territories with fuel e¢cient cars will drive
too much. Others may be overly discouraged from driving.10
This paper makes several contributions. First, we formalize Vickrey’s insights about the
externalities of driving by constructing a model relating miles driven to accidents. Second,
and more important, we make state by state estimates of the total gains from switching
to risk-classi…ed per-mile premiums, a uniform per-gallon charge, and optimal per-mile
premiums (which would include a tax to account for accident externalities). Our model
allows us to account for accident externalities in these estimates and for the resulting fact
that as driving falls, accident rates and hence per-mile insurance premiums will also fall.
We demonstrate that accident externalities are signi…cant in practice by showing that
9Actually, Vickrey’s …rst suggestion was that auto insurance be bundled with tires hoping that the wear
on a tire would be roughly proportional to the amount it is driven. He worried about moral hazard (using
a tire until it was threadbare), but concluded that this problem would be limited if refunds were issued in
proportion to the amount of tread remaining.
10Sugarman [1993] counters that the per-gallon fee does rough justice, and so performs better than the
current system.5
states with more tra¢c density have considerably higher accident cost per mile driven. The
more people drive on the same roads, the more dangerous driving becomes. Nationally,
the insured cost of accidents is roughly four cents per-mile driven, but the marginal cost –
the cost if an extra mile is driven – is much higher, roughly 7 and a half cents, because of
these accident externalities. In high tra¢c density states like New Jersey, Hawaii, or Rhode
Island, we estimate that the marginal cost is roughly 15 cents. For comparison, gasoline
costs roughly six cents per-mile, so charging for accidents at the margin would dramatically
increase the marginal cost of driving (though not necessarily the average cost).
A system of per-mile premiums would result in drivers paying the average – not the
marginal – cost of accidents. We estimate that sucha system would reduce driving nationally
by 9.2%, and insured accident costs by $17 billion. After subtracting the lost driving bene…ts
of $4.3-$4.4 billion, the net accident reductions would be $12.7 billion or $75 per insured
vehicle. Our low estimate of net accident reductions is $9.8 billion or $57 per vehicle. The
net savings would be $10.7-$15.3 billion if per-mile premiums were taxed optimally so that
the charge accounted for driving externalities and equaled the full marginal accident cost
of driving. These estimates do not account for heterogeneity in territory and drivers. Since
the most dangerous drivers in the most dangerous territories would face the steepest price
rise and reduce driving the most, actual bene…ts could be considerably larger. If state
heterogeneity is a useful guide, territory heterogeneity alone would raise the bene…ts of
either per-mile or optimal per-mile premiums by 10%.
A uniform gasoline tax (per-gallon premium) would not account for the heterogeneity in
fuel e¢ciency. Taking this into account, we estimate that net accident reductions would be
$8.5-$10.4 billion, roughly 20 percent less et al. our per-mile premium estimates. This …gure
assumes that per-gallon premiums would be set su¢ciently high to fund all compensation.
A more typical pay at the pump plan such as Sugarman’s [1993] that continues to use
substantial lumpsum fees wouldhave commensurately lower bene…ts. Another disadvantage6
of per-gallon premiums— one that we do not model— is that if these premiums are not
adjusted for territory, or if arbitrage limits the feasible adjustments, then the extra bene…ts
mentioned above from tailored pricing that accounts for intrastate heterogeneity in tra¢c
density and accident rates would not be realized.
The main reason insurance companies have not switched to per-mile premiums is prob-
ably that monitoring actual mileage with yearly odometer checks seems too costly given
their potential gains, as suggested by Rea [1992] and Williamson et al. [1967, p. 247]. 11
However, because of the gap in tort law pointed out above, their analysis suggests that
the gains a given insurance company could realize by switching to per-mile premiums are
considerably less than the social gains. If company A switches to per-mile premiums and
its customers drive less, many of the gains will accrue to company B whose customers will
get into fewer accidents with A’s customers. Because much of the accident reductions are
external, a single company and its customers might stand to gain only $31 per vehicle from
the switch, far less than the $75 or $91 per vehicle of per-mile or optimal per-mile premiums.
12 This discrepancy implies that the social gains from per-mile premiums might justify the
monitoring costs, even if no single insurance company could pro…t from the change itself.
Other external bene…ts make the discrepancy between the private gains from per-mile
premiums and the social gains even larger. As we observed, a great deal of accident costs
are uninsured or underinsured. The cost of fatality risk, for example, is substantially under-
insured. As with other accident costs, a substantial portion of these costs are external to a
given insurance company and its customers. Taking into account the expected reductions in
these external costs raises our estimates of the gains from per-mile premiums by $9.3-$11.1
billion. The case for policy intervention is strengthened further when nonaccident bene…ts
11Monitoring costs are cited as the principal reason by actuaries I have interviewed (see also Nelson [1990]
and Cardoso [1993]).
12In a competitive industry, insurance companies cannot pro…t from a coordinated change, because the
e¢ciency gains would be competed away in lower prices.7
such as congestion are taken into account. Congestion reductions raise our estimates of the
bene…ts from per-mile premiums by $5.5-$5.7 billion. This brings our estimates of total na-
tional bene…ts from per-mile and optimal per-mile premiums to respectively, $25-$29 billion
and $32-43 billion, or $146-$173 and $187-254 per insured vehicle. Bene…ts would be higher
still, if current gasoline taxes are less than pollution costs, road maintenance costs, and
other externality costs such as national security.13 The fact that accident and congestion
externalities could make up more than 80% of the bene…ts from per-mile premiums sug-
gests that even if monitoring costs are so large that it is rational for insurance companies to
maintain the current premium structure, per-mile premiums would probably still enhance
e¢ciency in most states once one takes account of these externalities.
Finally, the paper provides several policy ideas that could be used to change the unit
of insurance from the car-year to the car-mile. A …rst step would be for states to reduce
monitoring costs by recording odometer readings at existing safety or emissions checks
and distributing the information free to insurance companies. A bolder proposal is to tax
premiums to account for accident externalities. Such a tax would better align the private
gains from switching to per-mile premiums with the public gains. It would also increase
the total gains from switching, because the switch would lead to higher marginal charges,
closer to optimal charges though still neglecting the cost of congestion and pollution. We
also present a new proposal that would marry the virtues of pay-at-the-pump with per-
mile premiums, by charging risk-classi…ed per-gallon premiums metered at the pump. Such
a system could make metering cheap, while making it more di¢cult to drive uninsured.
13These costs could easily be higher. The marginal cost per gallon of gasoline in terms of national security
interest is di¢cult to quantify, but it is undoubtedly substantial. National defense involves many common
costs, so it would be highly speculative to estimate the amount spent to defend oil interests. Nonetheless, the
total amount of money the U.S. spends per year to defend U.S. interests or prepare to defend U.S. interests
in oil producing countries could be comparable to current gasoline tax revenues ( $51 billion, or 37 cents per
gallon, in 1994, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1997, tables 478 and 1029). In the 1990s alone, the U.S.
has had one war and three showdowns with Iraq.
Delucci [1997] estimates that the pollution costs of motor vehicles in terms of extra mortality and morbidity
are 26:5¡461.9 billion per year in the U.S..8
Unlike pay at the pump, charging risk-classi…ed premiums could address equity concerns and
provide caretaking incentives. It would also keep insurance agents in business so that they
don’t oppose reform too vocally. In fact, if these premiums are metered at the pump so that
the uninsured motorist problem is limited or eliminated, then insurance agents’ business
will actually expand signi…cantly. There would also be substantial incidental bene…ts to
any individualized metering program that simple pay-at-the-pump plans can’t o¤er: for
example, pollution and road usage charges could piggyback on the system and be tailored
to the model and age of each vehicle.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model
of accidents. Section 3 describes our data sources. Section 4 reviews existing evidence and
arguments about the relationship between miles driven and accidents and uses the model
developed in Section 2 to estimate the relationship. Section 5 describes our simulations
of three policy changes: per-mile premiums, optimal per-mile premiums, and uniform per-
gallon premiums. Section 6 asks why we don’t see per-mile premiums now and presents
several policy ideas to facilitate their implementation in a cost-e¤ective fashion.
1 A Simple Model of Accidents and Congestion.
We now develop a model relating driving to accidents and use it to simulate the conse-
quences of various pricing scenarios. For simplicity, we construct an entirely symmetric
model in which drivers, territory, and roads are undi¤erentiated and identical. The central
insights continue to hold in a world where some drivers, roads, and territories are more
dangerous than others, with some provisos. The relationship between aggregate accidents
and aggregate miles will only hold exactly if the demand elasticity is the same across types
of driving and drivers. Otherwise, accidents will be either more or less responsive to driving
according to whether extra miles are driven by more or less dangerous drivers under more
or less dangerous conditions.9
We also limit attention to one and two vehicle accidents, ignoring the fact that many
accidents only occur because of the coincidence of three or more cars.14 We treat accidents
involving two or more cars as if they all involve only two cars because multi-vehicle accidents
are not separated in our accident data. Re…ned data would increase our estimates of the
bene…ts from the driving reductions associated with per-mile premiums because the size of
accident externalities increase with the number of cars involved in collisions.
Let
mi = miles traveled by driver i
M = total vehicle miles traveled
l = total lane miles
D = tra¢c density = M/ l
fi =probability that i is driving at any given time
±1 = damages from one-vehicle accident
±2 = damages to each car in a two-vehicle accident
Holding speed constant, the fraction of the time that i is driving, fi, will be proportional
to miles, mi, so let fi = ½mi. For convenience, imagine the l lane miles are divided into
L = lz distinct locations. An accident occurs between driver i and j if they are in the same
location and neither brakes. The chance that i is driving and j is in the same location is
fi (fj=L). Let q be the probability that neither brakes (or takes other successful evasive
action) conditional upon being in the same location. The rate of damages to i from two-car










14For example, one car may stop suddenly causing the car behind to switch lanes to avoid a collision—
the accident occurs only if another car is unluckily in the adjacent lane.10










Ignoring multiple car accidents, the total expected accident damages su¤ered by driver i
are then
ai = c1mi +c2 miD
The …rst term in the equation re‡ects the fact that a driver may be involved in an
accident even if he is driving alone (e.g., falling asleep at night and driving into a tree),
with c1 representing the expected accident costs from driving a mile alone. The second
term re‡ects the fact that the chance of getting into an accident with other vehicles in that
mile increases as the tra¢c density D increases. The linearity of this model in mi ignores
the possibility that practice and experience could bring down the per-mile risk, as well as
the o¤setting possibility that driving experience (which is generally a safe experience) could
lead to complacency and conceit.
Summing over each driver i yields the total accident costs:
A = c1M + c2MD = c1M +c2M2=l: (1)
Observe that the cost of two-car accidents c2M2=l increases with the square of total
miles.
The marginal total accident cost from driving an extra mile is
dA
dM
= c1 +2c2D: (2)
In contrast, the marginal cost of accidents to driver i is only11
dai
dmi
= c1 +c2D: (3)
The di¤erence between these two costs, c2D, is the externality e¤ect. It represents the
fact that when driver i gets in an accident with another driver he is typically the ”but
for” cause of both drivers’ damages in the sense that, but for him having been driving,
the accident would not have happened. (Strangely enough, both drivers are typically the
”but for” cause of all damages). This model could overstate the externality e¤ect because
of accident substitution: i.e., because if driver A and B collide, it is possible that driver A
would have hit driver C if driver B weren’t there. 15 Such a substitution e¤ect would be
captured in our regression estimates by a lower coe¢cient on tra¢c density, and hence a
lower estimate of the externality e¤ect.
A di¤erent view of the accident externality of driving is found by observing that the
average cost of accidents per mile driven is:
A
M
= c1 +c2D: (4)
A given driver who drives the typical mile expects to experience the average damages A
M.
Yet, this driver also increases D, which means that he also causes the accident rate for
others to rise by dD
dM.
Let c0 denote the social cost of driving a mile, exclusive of accident costs (i.e., c0 includes
gasoline, maintenance, and environmental costs). Consider n identical drivers and let V (m)
be each person’s value for driving m miles V 0 > 0 and V 00 < 0. Then, total driving surplus
will be maximized if m¤¤ is chosen to solve
max




15On the other hand, it understates the externality e¤ect to the extent that some collisions require more
than two vehicles.12
The …rst-order condition for this program is:




In contrast, an individual who pays charge p per-mile will maximize
V(m) ¡pm;
choosing an m¤ so that V 0(m¤) = p:
If p is set equal to c0+c1+2c2
nm¤¤
l , then each individual will choose m¤ = m¤¤: Accord-
ingly, one might hope that a competitive insurance industry charging per-mile premiums
would choose p¤¤ = c1 + 2c2
nm¤¤
l : However, the break-even condition for insurance is that
np¤m¤ = A(m¤) = c1nm¤ + c2
n2m¤2
l : If m¤ = m¤¤ , then the per-mile premium will be
c2
nm¤¤
l lower than would be socially optimal, indicating that people will drive too much
under per-mile premiums. Again, the discrepancy between actual premiums and e¢cient
premiums arises because both cars in a two-car accident are the “but for” cause of the
accident – if either car had been absent, the accident would not have occurred. E¢ciency
therefore requires that each car pay the full cost of the accident, as Vickrey [1968] empha-
sized.16 This e¢ciency condition necessarily implies that more be collected in premiums
than is required to compensate for damages. If all accidents were simple two-car accidents,
then twice as much would need be collected. Competition in insurance pricing requires, in
contrast, that insurance companies break even.
Fundamentally, driving causes an externality. If a person decides to go out driving
instead of staying at home or using public transportation, she may end up in an accident,
and some of the cost of the accident will not be borne by either her or her insurance
16Another way to derive our formula for accidents, in which two-vehicle accidents are proportional to the
square of miles driven, is to begin with the premise that the marginal cost of a mile of driving is the expected
cost of accidents to both parties that will occur during that mile. Then the marginal cost of accidents will




M . The unique solution to this di¤erential equation, in which
the elasticity of accidents with respect to miles is 2, is A2¡car = c2M
2.13
company; some of the accident cost is borne by the other party to the accident or that
party’s insurance company.
1.1 Gains from Per-mile Premiums.
We now compare the current insurance system, which we characterize (somewhat unfairly)
as involving lump sum premiums, with two alternative systems: per-mile premiums and
optimal per-mile premiums. As derived above, the break-even condition for insurance com-




= c1 + c2M=l (5)
This equation can be viewed as the supply curve for insured miles.
Let the utility of each of the n drivers be quasi-linear in the consumption of non-driving
goods y and quadratic in miles m:




Then, the aggregate demand will be linear:
M = M0 ¡bp








If drivers continued to drive as much under per-mile premiums as they do under per-year,
then insurance companies would break-even by charging
p = c1 + c2M0=l:14
However, as driving falls in reaction to this charge, the accident rate per-mile will also
fall (because there will be fewer cars on the road with whom to collide). As the per-mile
accident rate falls, premiums will fall in a competitive insurance industry, as we move down
the average cost curve.
Assuming that the gas price currently re‡ects the environmental and road maintenance
cost of driving, the social gain from charging per-mile accident premiums in this model
equals the reduction in accident costs less the lost bene…ts from foregone driving, the shaded




















p¤ (M0 ¡ M¤): (7)
By assuming quasi-linear utility, we are ignoring income e¤ects. As a per-year premium
is shifted to a per-mile charge, driving will not fall by as much as it would under a pure
price change, because people don’t have to pay a yearly premium and can use some of that
money to purchase more driving then they would under a pure price change. These income
e¤ects are, however, overshadowed by our uncertainty about the price responsiveness of
driving, so it does not seem worthwhile to consider them explicitly. We ultimately run policy
simulations with elasticities of demand chosen to be below what many estimate. One reason
we do so is because we should properly use a Hicksian, and not Marshallian, elasticity of
demand in order to take income e¤ects into account and calculate “exact consumer surplus.”
Our bene…t calculation assumes that the number of drivers would remain unchanged
in a switch to per-mile premiums. In fact, the number of drivers would probably increase
under a per-mile system because the total price of driving a small amount (say 2,000 miles
per year) would fall. Although the extra drivers (who drive relatively little) will limit
driving reductions and hence accident reductions somewhat, they would probably increase
the accident savings net of lost driving bene…ts, and would surely do so in the case of optimal
per-mile premiums. The reason is that these extra drivers gain substantial driving bene…ts,15
as evidenced by their willingness to pay insurance premiums. In the case of optimal per-mile
premiums, where the premiums re‡ect the total accident cost of their driving, the entry of
these extra drivers necessarily increases the bene…ts from accident cost reductions net of
lost driving bene…ts.
One way to implement the optimal pricing scheme in this symmetric world would be
to have a competitive insurance market, pricing on a per-mile basis, with a tax of (
p¤¤
p¤ ¡
1) £ 100% on premiums. This solution would work under either a fault-based tort system
or a no-fault tort system, as long as every driver stands an equal chance of being at fault.
If drivers di¤er in ability, then taxing premiums will work better in a no-fault system than
in a tort system, however, because the optimal tax will not need to depend upon a driver’s
ability (i.e., upon expected share of total damages from relative negligence). To the extent
that a no-fault sytem limits recovery to economic damages, as it commonly does in practice,
the tax would need to be raised to account for the full externality.
1.2 Congestion
Congestion will fall if driving is reduced. In a fundamental respect, congestion is the coun-
terpart to accidents. Congestion occurs when driver i and j would be in the same location
at the same time except one or both breaks to avoid the accident. The resulting delay is,
of course, costly. A rudimentary model of congestion would therefore have congestion costs
rising with the square of miles, holding lane miles …xed, so that



















Equation (8) relates the average cost of delay to the marginal cost, so that we can use
estimates of the average cost of delay in order to estimate the marginal cost of delay, and in
particular the external marginal cost of delay. Schrank, Turner and Lomax [1995] provide
estimates of the average cost of delay, C
M.
Congestion cost savings that are external to the driving decision should also be added to
the bene…ts from per-mile premiums. Assuming, that the mile foregone is a representative
mile and not a mile drawn from a particularly congested or uncongested time, the person
foregoing the mile will escape the average cost of delay, C
M. This savings should not be
counted though among our bene…ts from driving reductions, because it is internalized.
Viewed di¤erently, the driver derives no net bene…t from the marginal mile, because driving
bene…ts net of congestion cost just equal operating costs. Yet, as there is less tra¢c on the
road, other drivers will experience reduced delays and this external e¤ect should be added
to our calculations. The external e¤ect, as with accidents, equals the di¤erence between




This estimate undoubtedly understates the marginal cost (and hence the external cost) of
congestion substantially, because as two vehicles slow down they generally force others to
slow down as well. A cascade of such e¤ects becomes a tra¢c jam. Looking at measured
‡ow rates of tra¢c as a function of the number of cars travelling suggests that during
periods of congestion the marginal congestion cost of driving is often many times, up to and
exceeding 10 times the average congestion experienced – at least during highly congested
periods.17 To be conservative, however, we assume that the marginal cost of congestion
is twice the average cost, so that the portion of the marginal cost that is external to the
driving decision equals the average cost.
17Author’s calculation based upon tra¢c ‡ow tables. GAO, “Tra¢c Congestion: Trends, Measures, and
E¤ects" GAO/PEMD-90-1, November 1989, p. 39.17
2 Data.
As a proxy for auto accident costs, we use state-level data on private passenger auto insur-
ance premiums from the National Association of Auto Insurance Commissioners Database
on Insurance Premiums for 1996. We subtract premiums paid for comprehensive coverage,
so that we are left only with accident coverage. If the insurance industry is competitive,
these …gures represent the true economic measure of insured accident costs, which includes
the administrative cost of the insurance industry and an ordinary return on the capital of
that industry. These premium data are for private passenger vehicles, so we adjust these
…gures to account for commercial premiums by multiplying by 1.14, the national ratio of
total premiums to noncommercial premiums.18
Insured accident costs do not come close to comprising all accident costs. As a result,
our estimates of the cost of driving are too low, and correspondingly, our estimates of the
bene…ts from the driving reductions associated with any of our policy changes are also
too low. Fatalities, for example are substantially underinsured and undercompensated.
Viscusi’s [1993] literature review concludes that a statistical life is worth $3-6 million, far
exceeding typical auto insurance limits.19 Even if coverages were this high, liability would
be limited to lost future wages, not the full value of life.
Damages are also not fully compensated for those who survive accidents. The pain and
su¤ering of at fault drivers is not insured, and auto insurance frequently does not cover their
lost wages. (In no fault states, pain and su¤ering is also not compensated below certain
thresholds). These omitted damages are probably substantial and their inclusion would raise
our estimates of the cost of driving and the bene…t of driving reduction signi…cantly.20 Pain
and su¤ering is often taken to be three times the economic losses from bodily injury. Data
18See, p.22, the Insurance Information Institute 1998 Fact Book.
19The State Farm Pennsylvania ratings manual of standard coverages caps out at $500,000.
20In Section ??, we account for fatalities separately.18
on the miles of lanes by state come from Table HM-60, 1996 Highway Statistics, FHWA.
Annual vehicle miles by state come from Table VM-2, 1996 Highway Statistics, FHWA.
Data on the distribution of fuel e¢ciency among vehicles in the current U.S. ‡eet, and the
distribution of miles by fuel e¢ciency of car come from the 1994 Residential Transportation
Energy Consumption Survey. We get gasoline prices by state from the Petroleum Marketing
Monthly, EIA, Table 31 (”all grades, sales to end users through retail outlets excluding
taxes”) and Table EN-1 (federal and state motor gasoline taxes). State level data on
fatalities come from Table 100 and Table 101 of ”Tra¢c Safety Facts 1996,” U.S. Department
of Transportation, Dec., 1997.
3 Estimates of the driving-accident relationship.
3.1 The literature.
Opinions di¤er about the relationship of driving to accidents. Patrick Butler and his col-
legues at the National Organization for Women have argued in editorials and insurance
journals that an individual driver’s accidents will be proportional to miles driven, or put
di¤erently, that the elasticity of accidents with respect to miles is 1. Butler, Butler, and
Williams (1988) point out that women drive roughly half as much as men, and have half
as many accidents. Dougher and Hogarty (1994) of the American Petroleum Institute, in
contrast, argue that an individual driver’s accident costs will depend little, if at all, upon
the amount of driving she does, and that other factors such as tra¢c density and type of
driving are more determinative.
Credible empirical work relating driving to accidents has been limited by the scarcity
of data pairing mileage and accidents. The ideal study would take such data and care-
fully control for the characteristics of drivers and the type of driving done in addition to
mileage. Raw data (controlling for nothing) collected by the Department of Motor Vehicles
in California suggests that the elasticity of an individual’s accidents with respect to mileage19
is roughly .5 (See Massachusetts Division of Insurance, 1978, table 1). Such data would,
however, understate this relationship (respectively, overstate it) if low mileage drivers were
worse (respectively, better) drivers or if they tended to drive under worse (respectively,
better) conditions.
The data provided by Butler, Butler and Williams [1988] on accident and annual miles




where asi is the number of accidents of drivers of sex s and age i, msi is the number of miles
driven by a driver of age i and sex s, and ¹ is the elasticity of an individual’s accidents
with respect to miles driven. (Average accident data strati…ed by sex and age comes from
the Penn. Department of Transportation, 1984, while annual mile data comes from the
U.S. Department of Transportation, 1983.) Although Butler, Butler and Williams [1988]
do not appear to estimate such a model explicitly, my regression estimates of equation (9)
suggest that the elasticity of accidents with respect to miles is ¹ = :92, close to the Butler-
Butler-Williams claim and close to the value of 1 assumed in the theoretical model. Such a
regression assumes that except for the di¤erences in their annual mileage, men and women
drive equally safely and under equally safe conditions. Undoubtedly, this assumption is
overly strong, but one fact stands in our favor: roughly speaking, men and women live in
the same territories and territory is a critical determinant of risk.
The best controlled study of which I am aware was done by Hu et al. (1998), who study
the e¤ects of health status on crash rates of elderly drivers in two rural Iowa counties. They
control for a driver’s experience and estimate elasticities of accidents with respect to miles
of .35-.5 (measured at 9,000 miles per year). There are several reasons, however, to think
these …gures are biased downward. First, the Iowa miles data must have substantial noise,20
as the data does not come from odometer checks but from asking the subjects how many
miles they drive in a typical week. Unlike insurance company data, there is no reason for
people to lie, but they may have highly uncertain estimates. Noisy data would bias the
miles coe¢cient toward 0 (except of course to the extent that the noise is correlated with
a factor related to accidents). Additionally, even a rural Iowa county is not homogeneous.
People who live in or near towns may drive substantially fewer miles than those who live
20 miles from the nearest grocery store, but the miles they drive may be in more congested
areas where they have more accidents per mile. Another compositional e¤ect is that those
who are good at driving may drive more (some but not all of this e¤ect will be picked up
by their health status variables). All three of these e¤ects will tend to mute the apparent
relationship between increased driving and increased accidents. This suggests that the
elasticity of an individual’s accidents with respect to that individual’s miles could be well
above .5 and perhaps even unity as our model assumes and Butler et al. argue.
The social elasticity of accidents with respect to miles of driving must substantially
exceed an individual’s elasticity because of the externality e¤ect explained in the previous
section. Even if the typical individual has an elasticity of .5, the elasticity of total accident
costs with respect to total miles driven would be close to 1 because any individual driver
will cause others to have extra accidents when he drives more. One piece of evidence on
the social elasticity comes from a study of California freeways from 1960-1962 (Lundy, 1964
cited in Vickrey, 1968). A group of 32 segments of four lane freeways with low average
tra¢c had a per-mile accident rate of 1.18 per million miles compared with 1.45 per million
miles on twenty segments with more tra¢c. The implied incremental accident rate was
1.98 accidents per million vehicle miles, suggesting an elasticity of accidents with respect to
miles of 1.7=1.98/1.18. Because of the externality associated with driving pointed out in
Section 1, we expect the elasticity of total accidents with respect to total miles to exceed the
elasticity of an individual’s accidents with respect to her driving. In fact, if an individual21
has elasticity of 1 as the model assumes, the ”aggregate” elasticity would be 2 if all accidents
involved 2 cars. The California highway data accords roughly with what one would predict
given that roughly 30% of accidents involve only one vehicle.21
3.2 Estimates of Marginal Accident Cost.
It is worth comparing accident costs in pairs of states that have similar numbers of lane
miles but very di¤erent numbers of vehicle miles traveled. For example, New Jersey and
Wyoming both have approximately 75,000 lane miles. New Jersey has eight and a half times
as much driving in New Jersey, however, and has an average insured accident cost of 7.7
cents per mile instead of the 1.8 cents per mile of Wyoming. Comparing Ohio and Oklahoma
we see a similar pattern. Ohio has approximately two and a half times as much driving on
a similar number of lane miles and has higher average accident cost (3.6 vs. 2.6 cents per
mile). Likewise, if we compare Hawaii and Delaware, which have similar numbers of vehicle
miles traveled, we …nd that Hawaii, which has fewer lane miles and so substantially higher
tra¢c density, has substantially higher accident costs per-mile. In general, average accident
costs are much higher in states that have a lot more driving, holding lane miles …xed. This
feature, which drives the high insurance rates in dense areas, is just another view of the
externality e¤ect. The fact that marginal accident costs are higher than average accident
costs is what drives up average accident costs as miles increase.
Many other idiosyncratic factors are involved, however, in a state’s insurance costs.
Maryland and Massachusetts, for example, have an almost identical number of lane miles
and fairly similar vehicle miles traveled. However, although Massachusetts drivers only
drive about 7 percent more miles per year in aggregate than Maryland drivers their average
costs per-mile is 40 percent higher (6.7 cents vs. 4.8 cents), so that total insured accident
costs are 45 percent higher. Whether this di¤erence is attributable to di¤erences between
21See table 27, U.S. Department of Transportation [1997].22
Massachusetts and Maryland drivers or di¤erences between the roads or weather in the
states is unknown. Cars may also be more expensive to repair in Massachusetts.
Here, we …t the model presented in Section 1 in order to form estimates of the marginal
accident cost from driving an extra mile in each of the 50 states. As explained in Section
3, we use total auto accident insurance premiums paid in a state as a proxy for the total
cost of automobile accidents. We estimate the e¤ects of tra¢c density on accidents in
two ways— by a calibration method and a regression method— as described below. The
regression method utilizes the cross-state variation in tra¢c density to estimate its e¤ect,
while the calibration method relies upon the structure of model and data on the percentage
of accidents involving multiple vehicles. Each method has weaknesses, and after discussing
the likely biases in each of these methods, we conclude that the true e¤ect of density lies
somewhere between the two estimates. The tra¢c density e¤ect allows us to estimate
the social marginal accident cost of driving and the extent to which this cost exceeds the
average, or internalized marginal, cost of driving.
We modify the model of Section 1, assuming that each state’s idiosyncratic errors "s
enter multiplicatively as follows:
As = (c1Ms +c2MsDs)(1 +"s): (10)
= c1sMs +c2sMsDs; (11)
where
c1s = c1(1 +"s)
c2s = c2(1 +"s)
Once c1 and c2 are estimated, we can …nd the idiosyncratic component "s for each state
from the above equation using the observed values of accident costs, miles traveled and lane23
miles in the state. We estimate the coe¢cients c1 and c2 in two ways — one way we call a
calibration model and the other a regression model.
In our calibrationmodel, we utilize national data onthe percentage of accidents involving
multiple cars. Recall that national accident costs are given by
A = c1M +c2MD;




Let a be the average damage per vehicle from an accident, so that two-vehicle accidents
have total damages of 2a and one-vehicle accidents have damages a. Let r denote the ratio of
accidents involving two vehicles. (Nationally, 71% of crashes were multiple-vehicle crashes
in 1996, and we assume that multi-car accidents involve only two cars, since we don’t have
data on the number of cars in multi-car accidents and since this assumption makes our
bene…t estimate conservative.)22
If N is the total number of accidents in a state we have:




22The statistic 71% is found by taking the ratio of the number of multiple vehicle crashes to total crashes
in table 27, U.S. Department of Transportation [1997]. This …gure understates the number of accidents that
involve multiple vehicles because if a single vehicle crashes into a …xed object, for example, that is a single
vehicle crash even if the vehicle swerved to avoid another car.24




and similarly for two-car accidents
A2 = 2r
1+rA:
The one and two-car accident coe¢cients can then be determined from the formulas:











Using the observed national data on accident costs (A), miles traveled (M), and lane
miles (l), we estimate that the one-vehicle coe¢cient ^ c1 is roughly .7 cents per-mile, while
^ c2 is 1 x 10¡5 cents per-mile squared per lane mile. This means that roughly 18% of costs
are attributed to one-car accidents.
In our regression model, we estimate the coe¢cients c1 and c2 with a cross-sectional
regression. Observe that equation implies that the average accident cost per-mile in state s
is As = [c1 +c2Ds](1+"s). Assuming that the idiosyncratic components "s are i.i.d. mean
zero random variables that are independent of Ds, OLS estimates ^ c1 and ^ c2 are consistent
under standard regularity conditions. Table 1 gives the results of the cross-sectional OLS
regression and the calibration method.
The estimate of the one-vehicle coe¢cient ^ c1 suggests a cost of 2.2 cents per-mile. The
other coe¢cient, ^ c2; is 5.5x10¡6 cents per squared mile per lane mile. The regression model
suggests that 55% of costs are attributable to one-car accidents, i.e., to the linear term.




= c1s + 2c2sDs:
We …nd the state-speci…c coe¢cients for one and two vehicle accidents as follows:
^ c1s = ^ c1(1 +^ "s)
^ c2s = ^ c2(1 +^ "s)
^ "s = As
^ c1Ms+^ c2MsDs ¡ 1:
Table 2 gives the marginal accident costs determined by the calibration and regression
methods. Table 2 allows us to compare these costs with the average accident cost per-mile
driven, which appears in column 3. The last row models the U.S. as a whole, treating it as a
single state. As we see, accounting for the Vickrey externality appears signi…cant regardless
of which method we use, in that the marginal cost of accidents signi…cantly exceeds the
average cost. The reason is that both estimation methods put signi…cant weight on the
quadratic term. The elasticity of accidents with respect to miles (i.e. the ratio of marginal
to average cost) is higher under the calibration model because that model puts more weight
on the quadratic term. Below, we discuss several reasons why the regression estimates
probably understate the density e¤ect (and hence the marginal cost of driving), and why
the calibration estimates overstate this e¤ect.
The calibration method probably over states accident externalities because the theoret-
ical model does not account for accident substitution— i.e., the possibility that if one of
the drivers in a two-car accident stayed home, another accident might have substituted for
the one that happened.23 A second upward bias results because in the calibration method,
c1and c2 are held constant, which does does not account for the fact that as driving be-
comes more dangerous, drivers and states both take precautionary measures. States react to
23Though this bias could be more than o¤set by the fact that many accidents require the coincidence of
more than two cars at the same place at the same time. Such accidents involve larger externalities than the
theoretical model predicts.26
higher accident rates with higher expenditures on safety by widening roads and lengthening
freeway on-ramps. Drivers also make …nancial expenditures, buying air bags or anti-lock
brakes, and non…nancial expenditures, by paying more attention and slowing down to avoid
accidents when driving in heavy tra¢c. All these precautionary measures mitigate the im-
pact of extra tra¢c density on accidents. At the margin, if precautions are chosen optimally
so that the marginal cost of precautions equals their marginal bene…t, then the envelope
theorem guarantees that the calibration method would still be properly capturing the sum
of accident and prevention costs (i.e., we can treat prevention as being …xed). However, to
the extent that people take too little precaution at the moment, the calibration results will
overstate the accident externalities. Even if precautions are currently optimal, the calibra-
tion results will overstate accident externalities for large changes in behavior, because the
marginal analysis of the envelope theorem will not be applicable.
The regression method picks up both of the e¤ects above, but unfortunately has several
biases of its own that tend to make it understate the e¤ects of density (accident externali-
ties). Two reasons revolve around the fact that we use insurance premiums as our measure
of accident costs. As mentioned at the paper’s outset, a substantial portion of accident costs
are not insured. If this fraction were constant across states, it would bias our calibration and
regression estimates down equally. However, states with more miles driven per lane mile and
higher accident costs have higher insurance premiums, and according to Smith and Wright
(1992), states with higher premiums will have substantially more uninsured motorists.24
With fewer drivers insured, a smaller share of total accident costs would be insured. This
e¤ect could bias our regression estimates of marginal cost downward signi…cantly. Another
downward bias for the regression results is that as accident rates and insurance costs rise,
states tend to adopt no-fault insurance reform limiting coverage of noneconomic losses so
24In fact, they argue that there is a feedback loop so that high premiums cause more uninsured motorists
and therefore higher premiums.27
that again the percentage of costs that are insured would be lower in high-cost states.
A third source of bias, which is probably substantial, is that our measure of tra¢c
density for a given state is a noisy measure of the tra¢c density where the typical mile
is driven in that state because of within-state heterogeneity. In particular, adding a lot
of miles of empty rural roads would not reduce the tra¢c density where people drive, nor
the number of accidents, but would reduce the predicted number of accidents from our
regression because the average tra¢c density would fall. This observation may explain
the large positive residuals in New York, for example. Noise in our measure of tra¢c
density would tend to lower our estimates of the accident cost of density. A …nal source of
downward bias is that the precautionary expenditures discussed above, which are induced
by high tra¢c density, are not included in our measure of insured accident costs.
To summarize, there are several reasons that the regression estimates underestimate the
e¤ect of density (and hence the marginal cost of accidents), while the calibration results
overestimate the e¤ect. The truth probably lies between these estimates, so we will treat
them as framing the reasonable range of estimates.
4 Policy simulations.
4.1 Methodology.
This section estimates and compares the potential bene…ts of charging per-mile premiums,
optimal per-mile premiums, and uniform per-gallon premiums. Per-mile premiums would
be a linear insurance charge proportional to miles driven that allows insurance companies
to break even, exactly covering accident costs. Optimal per-mile premiums would involve
taxing premiums to account for the externalities of accidents. Uniform per-gallon premiums
would be a linear insurance charge proportional to gallons of gasoline consumed that allows
insurance companies to break even. (As discussed in the introduction, most existing per-
gallonproposals are more modest, covering only a portion of insurance costs.) The di¤erence28
between per-mile and per-gallon premiums in our model is the variation among vehicles in
fuel e¢ciency. This estimation paints an overly rosy picture of uniform per-gallon premiums,
because it ignores the substantial heterogeneity among drivers in per-mile accident risk that
a uniform per-gallon premium would not account for. Such heterogeneity is manifest and
substantial across regions, and may also be present among drivers in the same region, though
Butler (1993) and Butler and Butler (1989) argue that miles driven is a larger determinant
of bad driver experience ratings than is bad driving.
Our calculations also ignore the costs and di¢culty of verifying the number of miles
traveled, two issues addressed in the section on implementation. However, they do account
for the cost of foregone driving bene…ts caused by the voluntary reduction in mileage that
would result from insurance being charged by the mile or by the gallon, as opposed to the
current system of by the year.
For each of these policy options—per-mile, optimal per-mile, and per-gallon premiums—
we estimate the consequences under three models of accident determination—linear, cali-
bration, and regression. The linear model assumes that accidents are proportional to miles
driven, i.e. that As = c1sMs. This model takes no account of the externalities from driving,
nor the related fact that as people reduce their driving, accident rates per mile should fall
because there are fewer drivers on the road with whom to have an accident. We also esti-
mate two models—a regression model and a calibration model—that include a term that
is quadratic in miles to account for the externality e¤ect. The one and two-car accident
coe¢cients are determined for these two models as described in the previous section.
We estimate a linear model for two reasons. First, the e¢ciency savings under a linear
model are what a single company and its customers could expect to receive if they alone
switchedto per-mile pricing. Comparing the linear model with the calibration andregression
models, therefore allows us to see how much of the accident savings are external to a given
driver and his insurance company. The estimates of the linear model are also relevant if29
there is in fact substantial learning-by-doing in driving that is not exhausted after the …rst
couple of years. If driving more lowers an individual’s accident rate so that they typical
individual has an accident elasticity with respect to miles of 1/2,25 then after accounting
for the externality e¤ect, the aggregate elasticity of accidents with respect to miles should
be approximately one as assumed in the linear model.
Our estimates of the results of these policies naturally depend upon the price responsive-
ness of driving. Estimates of the price responsiveness of driving are plentiful and generally
come from observed changes in the price of gasoline.
Our benchmark case assumes that the aggregate elasticity of gasoline demand with
respect to the price of gasoline is .15. This …gure is 25% lower than the short-run elasticity
of .2 that the two comprehensive surveys by Dahl and Sterner [1991 a,b] conclude is the
most plausible estimate, and also substantially lower than the miles elasticities estimated
by Gallini [1983]. Goldberg [1998, p. 15] has recently made an estimate of miles elasticity
near zero, though she argues that for large price changes such as those we consider here, a
…gure of .2 is more reasonable.26 Goldberg’s standard errors are su¢ciently large that her
estimate is also not statistically di¤erent from .2 at the …ve percent level.
From the perspective of social policy, we should be interested in long run elasticities.
Long run elasticities appear to be considerably larger than short run. Goodwin’s [1992]
survey suggests that time series studies give long run elasticities for petrol of .71 compared
with .27 for the short run; cross section studies give .84 compared with .28 for the short run.
Interpreting these long run elasticities in our context is problematic because in the long run,
there is substantial substitution among vehicles to more fuel-e¢cient vehicles which will be
driven more miles. Still, Johansson and Shipper estimate that the long run of elasticity of
miles per car with respect to fuel price is .2. Given vehicle substitution, this …gure suggests
25See, for example, the estimates in Hu et al. [1998] that were discussed in section 3.1
26Miles and gas elasticity di¤er by the elasticity of fuel e¢ciency with respect to fuel price. In the short
run, this elasticity is probably relatively small, though in the long run it could be substantial.30
that the bene…ts of per-mile premiums would, in the long run, be much larger than we
estimate.
From our assumed ‡eet gas price elasticity of .15, we compute the mile-price elasticity
(which we assume is constant across vehicles) as follows. Let
¹i = miles traveled by cars of fuel e¢ciency i miles per gallon.
e = the point elasticity of a given vehicle’s miles with respect to marginal price per mile
(assumed constant across vehicles).
gi = gas price per mile.
ti = total marginal price per mile = 4:2 cents (maintenance)+ 5 cents (depreciation) +
gi(gas price) +pi(insurance price)27
" = :15 = aggregate point elasticity of gasoline demand with respect to price of gasoline.
Note that since e is the miles elasticity for each vehicle with respect to marginal price
per mile, it is also the gasoline demand elasticity for that vehicle with respect to marginal
price per mile. Then e
gi
ti is both the mile elasticity and gasoline elasticity with respect to
the price of gasoline for a vehicle with fuel e¢ciency i mpg. Since the proportion of gasoline





, we can solve for e using the following
relationship:












Since driving demand is linear, and each car of fuel e¢ciency i is charged the same per-




ti0 (where the subscript
0 denotes the value variables take on under current practice, with zero margiinal insurance
charges).31
31For a linear demand curve D(t) with a point elasticity of e at price t0, the reduction in demand from a
price increase ¢tis exactly D(t0)e
¢t
t0 :31
Solving this equation simultaneously with the per-mile premium zero pro…t condition
(equation (1.1)) yields the equilibrium miles M¤ and per-mile premiums p¤. We …rst com-
pute this equilibrium for each state. We then model the U.S. in two ways: …rst, in a
disaggregated model where the national mile reduction is the sum of state mile reductions
and second, treating the nation in an aggregated fashion as if it itself were a state. We use
the equilibrium values p¤
s;M¤
s to compute surplus in each state s according to equation (7).
Next, we consider a per-gallon charge °. The corresponding per-mile price for a car of
fuel e¢ciency i is pi = °=i. As we have emphasized, the per-mile price depends upon fuel
e¢ciency under standard per-gallon proposals. Driving demand is then given by







The break-even condition under per-gallon premiums becomes:
X
i







Solving these two simultaneous equations in each state s yields the equilibrium per-
gallon charge °¤
s and miles M¤
s.32 We can no longer use equation (7) to compute the social
gain because each car type faces a di¤erent price rise pi under per-gallon charges. We
can compute lost driving surplus from the movement along the gasoline demand curve.
The percentage change in gasoline demand for a car of fuel e¢ciency i is the same as the
percentage change in miles: e
°¤
iti0. Since the initial gasoline demand for cars of fuel e¢ciency


















¤ requires solving a quadratic equation, but we can ignore the root that yields negative
miles.32
The Harberger triangle of lost driving surplus is quite small for cars with high fuel
e¢ciency i, since i is squared in the denominator of the lost driving surplus expression. The
vehicles do not cut their gasoline consumption much because gasoline is a small percentage
of their operating expenses and so the increase in gasoline price results in a relatively small
percentage increase in operating expenses.
Finally, to simulate optimal per-mile premiums, we replace the zero pro…t condition with
the requirement that premiums equal the marginal social accident cost of driving. Thus,
the “supply” equation for insured miles under optimal per-mile premiums is
p = c1 +2c2M=l
We solve this equation simultaneously with equation (??) for each state to compute the
equilibrium under optimal per-mile premiums.
4.2 Results.
Since the consequences of all three premium options depend critically upon the price re-
sponsiveness of driving, we did sensitivity analysis by running all our nine simulations (the
three policy options—per-mile, optimal per-mile, and per-gallon premiums—under the three
models—linear, calibration, and regression) for aggregate gasoline demand elasticities of .1,
.15, and .2. We report selected results for elasticities .1 and .2, and report comprehensive
results in Tables 3-11 for our benchmark elasticity of .15.
4.2.1 Per-Mile Premiums
Tables 3 and 4 present our estimates of the consequences of switching to per-mile premiums.
The national reduction in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) is approximately 10% in all three
models. The reduction is somewhat less in the nonlinear models because in those models,
as driving is reduced, the risk of accidents also falls and with it, per-mile premiums. Since
equilibrium per-mile premiums are lower in these models, the total driving reduction is33
lower. This e¤ect is much more pronounced in the calibration model, because of the larger
tra¢c density e¤ect from two-car accidents in this model. Under the calibration models
in Massachusetts, the per-mile charge falls from 6.7 cents per-mile to 5.8 cents per-mile as
driving is reduced (compare Tables 2 and 3).
Reductions in driving would naturally be much larger in states that currently have high
insurance costs and would thus face high per-mile premiums. For example, if we compare
New Jersey with Wyoming (two states with similar lane miles but very di¤erent VMT’s)
we …nd that implementing per-mile premiums would reduce New Jersey’s VMT by 16.2
percent under our calibration model versus 4.4 percent in Wyoming. The reduction is much
larger in New Jersey because the higher tra¢c density there leads to higher accident rates:
the per-mile premium in New Jersey would be 6.5 cents per-mile as compared to 1.8 in
Wyoming.
None of the per-mile premiums have been adjusted for uninsured drivers, because data
on the percentage of uninsured drivers is poor. Estimates of the percentage of uninsured
drivers are often in the neighborhood of 25 % (see Khazzoom [1997], Sugarman [1993],
and Smith and Wright [1992]). Our estimates of the per-mile premium are calculated by
dividing estimated insured accident costs by total miles driven rather than by insured miles
driven. This could substantially understate the actual per-mile premiums if total miles
substantially exceed insured miles. However, it wouldn’t change our estimates of aggregate
driving reductions signi…cantly because even though the per-mile premium would be higher
for insured miles, it would be zero for uninsured miles.33
The bene…ts we estimate for accident savings net of lost driving bene…ts are substantial
in all three models. Nationally, these net accident savings range from $5 billion to $12.6
33Let u be the fraction of uninsured drivers and ^ p be our estimate of true per-mile premiums. If premium
^ p
1¡u is charged on (1¡u) percent of miles, then the aggregate mile reduction is identical to our estimate given
linear demand. Some revenue shortfall could be expected because priced miles fall by a larger percentage
than in our estimate. However, this is approximately o¤set by the fact that insured accident losses could be
expected to fall by more than we estimate, because driving reductions would be concentrated in the insured
population.34
billion. The di¤erence between our $5 billion estimate under the linear model and our $12.6
billion under the calibration model is dramatic: Accounting for accident externalities raises
our estimate of bene…ts by 150 percent. Such a large di¤erence makes sense. If a price
change for driver A causes her to drive less, much of her reduction in accident losses is
o¤set by her lost driving bene…ts. In contrast, driver B, with whom she might have had
an accident, gains outright from the reduced probability of having an accident with A who
is driving less. Taking this externality e¤ect into account, nationally, the net gain is $75
per insured vehicle under the calibration model. However, since insurance companies and
their customers don’t take the externality bene…ts into account, their view of the gain from
per-mile premiums is probably closer to the $31 of our linear model. In high tra¢c density
states, the gain per insured vehicle is quite high – approximately $150 in Massachusetts and
New York and nearly $200 in Hawaii and New Jersey under the calibration model.
Compare the net accident reductions in the last two rows of Table 4. Accident reductions
are about 10 percent higher when the U.S. is modeled in a disaggregated way. In the national
model, the U.S. is modeled as if it were a state and a uniform per-mile premium is charged
in every state. This estimate therefore does not pick up one of the important bene…ts
of determining per-mile premiums in a competitive insurance market. In a competitive
insurance market, there are no cross-subsidies among territories, so high prices are charged
in areas that have high accident rates, where the bene…ts from driving reduction will be
highest. Each of our state estimates su¤ers from the same problem. Our bene…t estimates
from per-mile premiums are lower than they would be in competitive insurance markets,
because there is substantial variation within a state in tra¢c density and accident rates.
Areas with high accident rates will be charged higher per-mile premiums and therefore
experience larger driving reductions. If within-state heterogeneity is similar to across-state
heterogeneity, we could expect that our estimates of net accident gains are 10 percent
lower than actual gains would be. Taking into account heterogeneity among drivers, as35
would happen naturally under a competitive system of per-mile premiums, would increase
bene…ts still further.
All of our bene…t estimates depend critically of course on driving elasticities. Driving
reductions and net accident savings are both higher (respectively lower) if the aggregate gas
demand elasticity is higher (respectively lower) than .15. The relationship between elasticity
and accident savings is somewhat sub-linear, however, because the externality e¤ect means
that gains are smaller when there is less driving. Nationally, net accident bene…ts go from
$9 billion for an elasticity of .1 to $16 billion for an elasticity of .2, using the calibration
model.
In general, the estimates of net accident cost savings under the regression model are
signi…cantly smaller than under the calibration model. This di¤erence results from the
regression model putting little weight on the externality a¤ect. As we have argued, this is
probably due to several likely biases resulting from state errors being negatively correlated
with tra¢c density. We therefore concentrate our attention on the calibration results.
Our calculation of net accident cost savings under the calibrationmodel does not account
for the possibility that reduced tra¢c density causes drivers to drive less carefully, or causes
states to spend less money making roads safe. It is likely that as tra¢c diminishes, people
will exercise less care, and so actual accident costs will not fall as much as we estimate.
However, this e¤ect is not necessarily a criticism of the calibration model estimates. At the
margin, this observation simply implies that some of our estimated accident cost reductions
will actually materialize as reductions in the cost of accident prevention. Assuming that the
tort system is currently ensuring an optimal level of care, our calculation will be accurate for
small reductions in driving. Some inaccuracy due to infra-marginal e¤ects are possible, but
these are probably small given that we are only considering driving reductions of 10-15%.
These calculations also ignore the fact that more drivers will choose to become insured
once they have the option of economizing on insurance premiums by only driving a few36
miles. Today, some of these low-mileage drivers are driving uninsured while others are
not driving at all. To the extent that per-mile premiums (or per-gallon premiums) attract
new drivers, the reduction in vehicle miles traveled will not be as large as our simulations
predict. This observation does not mean that the social bene…ts are lower than we predict.
In fact, they are probably higher. The per-year insurance system is ine¢cient to the extent
that low-mileage drivers who would be willing to pay the true accident cost of their driving
choose not to drive, because they must currently pay the accident cost of those driving
many more miles. Giving them an opportunity to drive and pay by the mile creates surplus
because their driving bene…ts exceed the cost (their bene…ts would always exceed the cost
under optimal per-mile premiums since they are choosing to pay the cost, and bene…ts
probably do under per-mile premiums since they pay most of the cost).
4.2.2 Uniform Per-Gallon Premiums.
Since we neglect driver heterogeneity, and within-state territory heterogeneity, our simula-
tions would estimate the same bene…ts for per-mile premiums and per-gallon premiums if
everyone drove vehicles of the same fuel e¢ciency. However, vehicles vary signi…cantly in
their gas mileage. Taking these composition e¤ects into account, we …nd that the bene…ts
of per-mile premiums are approximately 22 percent higher than per-gallon premiums: For
" = :15 national net accident savings are $10.4 billion under per-gallon premiums compared
with $12.7 billion under per-mile premiums. This di¤erence becomes more substantial for
higher elasticities and is 28 percent when " = :2.
It is not immediately obvious why per-gallon premiums perform worse than per-mile
premiums. After all, both are second-best policies. The explanation, however, can be
found in standard optimal tax theory. Since gasoline is a larger proportion of the operating
expenses for a car with low fuel e¢ciency than for a car with high fuel e¢ciency, cars
with low fuel e¢ciency will respond more to the price change given a similar elasticity with37
respect to the price of miles. The lesson from Ramsey’s theory of taxation is that the burden
of raising a given amount of revenue is minimized if the revenue is raised in such a way that
the reduction in consumption of each good is equivalent in percentage terms. In this case,
that means that each driver should reduce miles by the same percentage. That goal is not
accomplished by per-gallon premiums. Per-gallon premiums result in a higher percentage
of driving reduction by those who own low fuel-e¢ciency vehicles. Hence, if per-gallon
premiums and per-mile premiums raised the same amount of revenue in equilibrium (and
hence had the same accident reduction), per-gallon premiums would be worse because they
would entail larger lost driving bene…ts. The story is more complex, however, than simply
the fact that per-gallon premiums tax relatively elastic goods, because the equilibrium
accident reduction under per-gallon premiums is smaller than under per-mile premiums.
This fact also contributes to the under performance of per-gallon premiums.
The comparison of per-gallon and per-mile premiums would naturally change if existing
state and federal gasoline taxes do not take adequate account of the pollution externalities
from gasoline consumption. In that case, environmental externalities would argue in favor
of per-gallon premiums.
4.2.3 Optimal Per-Mile Premiums.
Finally, consider Tables 7 and 8, which present our results for optimal per-mile premiums.
Optimal per-mile premiums would involve a tax on premiums su¢ciently large that a driver
pays the full accident cost of his driving accounting for accident externalities. We calculate
the optimal premium here under the assumption that auto insurance premiums re‡ect all
accident costs. As we discussed in the introduction, the bulk of accident costs are not
covered by auto insurance. In particular, auto insurance covers a small fraction of the value
of statistical lives lost, and also doesn’t covered the pain and su¤ering of at fault drivers.
The reader should therefore keep in mind that truly optimal premium taxes would account38
for these costs and would be substantially higher than those used in our optimal per-mile
premiums simulations. This fact makes our estimates conservative: the gains from these
premiums and the gains from truly optimal premiums would be substantially higher than
those that we calculate.34




, so optimal per-mile premiums are the same as second best per-mile premiums. In our
calibration and regression models, however, which take account of the accident externalities,
the marginal cost of accidents exceeds the average cost. In consequence, the optimal policy is
to levy a tax on premiums. Under the calibration model, optimal per-mile premiums would
involve a tax of about 90% in high tra¢c density states such as New Jersey and about
40% in low density states like North Dakota. On average across the U.S., the premium tax
would be 83% under the calibration model compared with 19% under the regression model.
Because of the premium tax, driving reductions are substantially higher under optimal per-
mile premiums. For the calibration model, national driving reductions are 15.7% instead of
9.2% when " = :15. National net accident savings grow to $15.3 billion from $12.7 billion.
This increase is fairly modest because of the standard feature of Harberger triangles that
small price distortions (such as those under per-mile premiums) do not cause large welfare
losses. However, the premium tax would collect substantial revenues: $65 billion in the
calibration model. These revenues could substitute for revenues gained from other taxation.
The optimal per-mile premium is quite large in high tra¢c density states. Since the
marginal cost of accidents falls as driving falls, optimal premiums are particularly large
when gasoline elasticity is low. For " = :1, the optimal per-mile premium is approximately
12 cents in New Jersey and Hawaii. For a car that gets 20 miles to the gallon, this charge
would be equivalent to more than tripling the price of gasoline in New Jersey.
34The fact that life insurance or other insurance serves in part to …ll the compensation gap between auto
insurance and full compensation does not take away from this point.39
4.3 Additional Cost Savings: Congestion and Fatalities
These policy changes would yieldsubstantial savings inaddition to the accident costs savings
estimated above. In particular, congestion and fatalities will fall as driving falls. Not all of
the cost savings from reduced congestion and fewer fatalities should be added to the social
gain calculated above, however. Some of these costs are already internalized by drivers and
re‡ected in the driving demand curve. Also, some of the costs of fatalities are insured and
are therefore part of our measured accident cost savings. This subsection provides rough
estimates of the external portion of these cost savings.
4.3.1 Fatalities
Automobile insurance only covers a small portion of the monetized cost of fatalities. Re-
sponsible estimates of the cost of a “statistical life” vary widely, but tend to lie between
$1-$10 million.35 Viscusi [1993] concludes that “the reasonable estimates of the value of
life are clustered in the $3 million-$7 million range,” and that the value should be higher
when considering the general population. (The value of a statistical life is the revealed
willingness to pay for a small reduction in the probability of premature fatality weighted
by that probability.) Automobile insurance limits rarely exceed $500,000, so most of the
cost of fatalities is not insured by our though insurance. Since we used insurance premiums
as a proxy for accident costs, our accident cost savings do not re‡ect the full value of lives
saved. We assume that $4.5 million is uninsured and judgment-proof, either because of
bankruptcy or lack of legal liability.36 This value is chosen to be conservative, taking the
middle value from Viscusi’s range and subtracting $500,000. Some portion of this value is
presumably internalized, however. In particular, in deciding how many miles to drive, a
rational driver already considers the cost he places on an increased chance of premature
mortality. To the extent that he is judgment-proof, however, he will not consider the costs
35See Viscusi (1993) and Fisher et al. (1989).
36In comparison, the Urban Institute study [1991] used a …gure of $2.4 billion per life in 1988 dollars.40
he imposes on others. In 1996, roughly 15 percent of auto accident fatalities, or 6,300, were
to non-occupants, largely bicyclists and pedestrians.37 Roughly 41% of fatalities (17,500)
were from collisions with another motor vehicle in transport.38 Since from any driver’s
perspective at least 1/2 of the fatalities he expects from multi-vehicle accidents will be in
other vehicles, summing these …gures suggests that 36% of the 42,000 auto fatalities in
1996 were external to the driving decision. This methodology understates the externalities
considerably, since in many cases, a car will overturn or collide with some …xed object to
avoid hitting another vehicle.
Under the assumption that as driving falls, fatalities fall inproportion to accidents, Table
10 gives the monetized value of statistical lives saved that are uncompensated by insurance
and are external to the driving decision. This value is a bene…t of per-mile premiums in
addition to the net reduction in insured accident costs estimated in Section 4.2. Under our
calibration model, the 10% national driving reduction would lead to approximately 6600
fewer fatalities for " = :15. Under the assumptions discussed above, we should therefore
add about $11 billion ¼ 6600 £ :36 £ $4:5million to the bene…ts calculated in the previous
section to account for fatalities. Note that the bene…ts under optimal per-mile premiums
would be even higher if the optimal premium included a payment to account for external
fatalities, rather than just being the optimal charge to account for external accident costs.
Life insurance and other non-auto insurance policies do, of course, helped to …ll the
compensation gap between auto insurance coverage and the full value of life, but this fact
does not a¤ect the accuracy of the estimates above. When one person’s driving saves the
life of a pedestrian, bicyclist, or another driver, the cost savings does not disappear merely
because that person’s life was insured. Such insurance only shifts the cost to the insurance
company. The $500,000 in assumed compensation from auto insurance was subtracted
37Table 53, U.S. Department of Transportation [1997].
38Table 66, U.S. Department of Transportation [1997].41
from our value of life to avoid double counting because the savings was already counted
in the previous section as a reduction in the insured cost of accidents. Since fatality costs
insured by non-auto insurance was excluded from the previous section, it should properly
be included in this calculation.
4.3.2 Congestion
Some portion of congestion cost savings should also be added to the bene…ts from per-mile
premiums. These costs are large and a growing concern.39 A detailed study by Schrank,
Turner and Lomax [1995] estimates that the cost of congestion from delay and increased fuel
consumption in the U.S. exceeded $49 billion in 1992 and $31 billion in 1987.40 This study
valued time at $8.50/hr. in 1987 and $10.50/hr. in 1992, which will seem a considerable
undercounting to those who, like myself, would far prefer to be at work than stuck in
a tra¢c jam. If we project this …gure to $60 billion in 1995, this amounts to 2.5 cents
for every mile driven. As discussed in presenting our model, although the marginal cost
of congestion is many times the average cost of congestion during congested periods, we
conservatively assume that the marginal cost of congestion is twice the average cost, so that
the external marginal cost of congestion equals the average. Table 9 gives our estimates of
the national portion of congestion reduction that is external and should be added to net
accident bene…ts and fatality reductions for " = :15. In all models, estimated externalized
gains from congestion reductions are large, ranging from $4.2 billion to $9.4 billion. Under
per-mile premiums, congestion reductions are largest in the regression and linear models
because in those models, accident rates (and hence per-mile premiums) don’t fall much or
at all as driving falls. In contrast, the congestion reductions for optimal per-mile premiums
39A recent poll by Mark Baldarassare shows that voters in California are “most satis…ed with their jobs”
and “most negative about tra¢c.” New York Times 6/2/98, A1, “Economy Fades As Big Issue in Newly
Surging California.”
40My summation for the 50 urban areas they studied. See Table A-9, p. 13, and Table A-15, p. 19, in
Shrank, Turner and Lomax [1995]. See also Delucci [1997], who estimates congestion costs at $22.5-99.3
billion.42
are largest ($9.4 billion) under the calibration model, because of the large premium tax that
accounts for accident externalities from driving. Congestion reductions are smallest under
per-gallon premiums because this policy yields the smallest driving reduction of the three,
as discussed above.
These calculations are based upon the average cost of delay. Congestion delays, of
course, are concentrated during certain peak time periods and at certain locations. This
fact simply means that the congestion reductions from per-mile pricing are concentrated
during these time periods and these locations. Our calculations are robust provided that the
elasticities of demand for congested miles and non-congested miles are comparable, and that
the externalized marginal cost is a constant multiple of average cost.41 The concentration
of congestion costs simply suggest that we would be even better o¤ if driving were priced
particularly high during congested periods and somewhat lower otherwise.
4.4 Total Bene…ts.
Table 11 gives total estimated annual national bene…ts from per-mile, per-gallon, and opti-
mal per-mile premiums for " = :15: The total bene…ts are expressed both in aggregate and
per insured vehicle. These annual bene…ts are quite high and using the regression estimates
as our lower bound and the calibration estimates as our upper bound suggests that charging
by the mile would be socially bene…cial if verifying miles could be achieved for less than
$146-$173 per car each year. Note that external bene…ts made up $20-$24 billion of our es-
timated bene…ts since net accident savings were only $5 billion under the linear model. The
gains under optimal per-mile premiums were higher still at $187-$254 per vehicle. These
41To understand why, consider a model with two types of miles: A;B. Let the initial quantities of driving
these miles be a, b, and let Ca;Cb be the total cost of delay during driving of types A;B respectively. Then,
the average cost of delay is c =
Ca+Cb
a+b , and the average cost of delay during driving of the two types is
ca = Ca=a;cb = Cb=b. The externalized marginal congestion costs are likewise ca;cb. Observe that if a
uniform per mile price p is charged for both types of miles, the congestion savings will be
p"
g [aca + bcb] =
p"
g (Ca + Cb), where g is the initial gas cost per mile of driving, and " is the elasticity of miles with respect
to the price of gasoline. This is equivalent to what we would calculate if we treated the two types of miles
equivalently, with c as the externalized marginal cost of miles. Then we would estimate the congestion
reduction as:
p"
g [a + b]c =
p"
g (Ca + Cb):43
estimates neglect environmental gains that would result if the current price of gasoline does
not adequately account for emissions, noise pollution and road maintenance. Our estimates
also did not account for underinsured and uninsured accident costs to those who survive ac-
cidents. Including these latter …gures into our estimates of eliminated accident externalities
would raise the estimated bene…ts by several billion dollars more.
The total bene…ts are quite large even for the linear model where accidents are pro-
portional to mileage. Under the linear model, the total bene…ts of per-mile premiums are
$107 per vehicle, and the bene…ts of per-gallon premiums are $88 per vehicle. This model
would be roughly accurate if individual elasticities of accidents with respect to miles were
.5, because then the externality e¤ect would make the social elasticity roughly one, as in
a linear model. Estimates under the regression model lie roughly halfway in between the
linear model and the calibration model.
5 Implementation.
This section begins by asking the economist’s standard question: If per-mile premiums
are so great, why don’t we see them already? After discussing the likely reasons for their
absence, we argue that the fact that insurance premiums are now only weakly tied to actual
miles driven. Finally, we discuss several options for facilitating or implementing per-mile
premiums.
5.1 Why don’t we see per-mile premiums now?
Standard contracting analysis predicts that an insurance company and its customers would
not strike a deal with a lump sum premium if accident costs increase with miles, and if miles
are observable. In that case, as Rea [1992] has pointed out, the insurance company could
charge for insurance by the mile and make more money while leaving its customers as well
o¤ or better o¤. (If the insurance company is a mutual company it could give this excess44
back to policyholders.) There are several reasons, however, why this price restructuring may
not be or may not appear to be a Pareto improvement to the customer and his insurance
company. We discuss these reasons below.
Monitoring costs. As Rea points out, checking odometers is costly, and the gains to
the insurance company and its customers from more e¢cient pricing may be less than
the cost to the customer and the insurance company than of bringing a car to a certi…ed
odometer checker every year. However, as this paper has emphasized, many of the gains from
the customer driving less will be realized by other drivers and other insurance companies,
because there will be fewer accidents, less congestion, and less pollution. Our estimates
suggest that these external e¤ects are large and could justify per-mile premiums, even in
cases where insurance companies and their customers would not want to choose per-mile
premiums on their own. Additionally, it may be much cheaper to monitor miles if all
insurance carriers charge for insurance by the mile, as we argue below.
Low elasticities. Driving might also be less price sensitive than our estimates assume.
Some in the insurance industry have argued that drivers will not respond to price changes
and therefore criticize per-mile premiums (see Nelson [1990]). Certainly, there is no guaran-
tee that drivers will be as responsive to price changes as we assume. However, our assumed
price elasticities lie in the middle range of existing estimates, and the truth could be either
higher or lower. The possibility that price elasticities could be lower is therefore a poor
justi…cation for current pricing.
Adverse selection. Adverse selection is another reason that a given insurance company
may not want to switch to per-mile premiums on its own. Even if the insurance company
knows the average miles driven per year by drivers in a given risk pool, it does not (currently)
know the miles that given individuals drive. If it charges a per-mile premium equal to the
current yearly premium for the pool divided by the average number of miles driven by
drivers in the pool, it will lose money. Those who drive more miles than the average will45
leave the pool for a …rm charging per-year rates and those who drive less miles will stay with
this insurance company. However, low mileage drivers in any given per-year risk class with
a given accident experience level will tend to be worse drivers than high mileage drivers in
the same risk class. (Accident costs divided by miles driven would be a sensible measure of
per-mile risk.) This adverse selection means that the insurance company will have to charge
a fairly high per-mile price to break even given the selection problem and the possibility
that high-mileage drivers can choose to pay …xed annual premiums with other insurance
companies. In principle, the insurance company could probably …nd a su¢ciently high per-
mile price that would increase pro…ts. However, one could understand the hesitancy of a
marketing director to propose to the CEO that the insurance company change its pricing
structure in a way that would make its prices less attractive than other insurance companies’
to a large percentage of its current customers. The CEO would probably balk, even if the
…nest economic consultants argued that the plan should increase pro…ts.
Risk aversion. Customers may not know exactly how many miles they will drive in a
year, and so there is an insurance motive to continue charging them a …xed yearly price.
However, we don’t see gasoline clubs that sell a year’s worth of gasoline for a …xed price,
nor vacation clubs that sell a year’s worth of airplane travel for a …xed price. The moral
hazard problem is simply too large.
Odometer fraud. If premiums are based upon odometer readings, the …rst thought
to spring to any economist’s mind will be that people will tamper with their odometers to
reduce insurance premiums. Perhaps surprisingly, insurance industry advocates do not bring
up this possibility when they write in opposition to the idea of charging by the mile. While
odometer tampering is certainly a concern, it is probably not a huge problem. Tampering
with an odometer is already a crime, and this simple fact will be enough to stop most
people from tampering. Additionally, tampering with an odometer is not trivial and most
people will not be able to do this on their own. Currently, there are substantial incentives46
to set odometers back to sell used cars. The odometer fraud unit within the Department
of Transportation believes, however, that such tampering generally does not occur when
individuals sell their cars (despite the fact that they could make several thousand dollars by
tampering), and is generally restricted to the wholesale car trade. Today, there is apparently
no retail market for setting back odometers, despite large incentives when selling a used
car.42 Some combination of the penalties from violating the law (real or of conscience)
together with the di¢culty of adjusting odometers appears to be su¢cient at present to
deter most tampering. Penalties could be adjusted upward somewhat to compensate for
the increased incentive to tamper resulting from insurance premiums being based upon
miles.
Prospective nature of insurance. A …nal reason that some insurance executives have
given to explain why they don’t charge per-mile premiums is that insurance charges are
prospective in nature. They don’t want to collect ex post surcharges from drivers who
drive a lot, particularly if the driver had no accident. This problem, however, could be
surmounted easily if the charge were guaranteed in advance by a credit card company.
5.2 Policy Ideas for Implementing Per-mile Premiums.
This section presents several policy ideas that address the practical and political problems
involved in switching to a per-mile premium regime.
The …rst thing the government could do to facilitate the adoption of per-mile premiums
would be to reduce the cost of monitoring miles, which is probably the principal reason,
other than inertia, that per-mile premiums are not currently charged. The simplest thing
to do in states such as Massachusetts that already have regular checks of automobiles for
safety or emissions, would be to record odometer readings at these checks and transfer
this information together with vehicle identi…cation numbers to insurance companies. This
42Setting back an odometer 40,000 miles could increase the sale price of most cars by $2,000 - $4,000.47
would remove the need for a special trip and special stations for odometer checking. Even in
states that do not have any safety or emissions checks, there would be substantial economies
of density in checking odometers simply because the time required to travel to the nearest
odometer checking station would be much smaller if all insurance companies switched to
per-mile premiums at once than if a single company did.
Another way to encourage insurance companies to switch to per-mile premiums would
be to transfer some of the externality gains to them. For example, since per-mile premiums
would help states meet the standards of the Clean Air Act, states or localities could provide
…nancial incentives to insurance companies that switched (e.g., tax credits or valuable pol-
lution permits). Money might also justi…ably be used from the Highway Trust Fund, since
with less driving, fewer roads are needed.
An interesting possibility proposed in March 1998 by the National Organization for
Women is to require insurance carriers to o¤er customers a choice between per-mile and
per-year premiums. The idea of choice arose from the Auto Choice Bill currently before
Congress that would give customers the choice between no-fault and tort regimes. Such a
choice plan would be politically appealing. Additionally, the selection e¤ects under a choice
system would favor per-mile premiums. For any given per-mile price and per-year price, we
would expect drivers below some mileage cuto¤ to choose per-mile premiums, and drivers
above the cuto¤ to choose per-year premiums. As low mileage drivers left the per-year
insurance pool, however, the average per-year accident rate in that pool would rise. As
per-year premiums rose in consequence, the cuto¤ would rise and more high-mileage drivers
would peel o¤ and sign up for per-mile insurance. Eventually, the per-year insurance system
would disappear entirely if the per-mile accident risk for an individual were independent
of the amount the individual drove and if monitoring miles were costless. Otherwise, there
might be an equilibrium where both systems survived.
A somewhat more daring approach would be to tax insurance premiums to account for48
accident externalities. Such a tax would be sound policy on its own even if premiums remain
weakly linked to mileage, but a premium tax would also encourage insurance companies to
switch to per-mile premiums. A premium tax would raise the private gains from reducing
driving and with it, accident costs and premiums. A tax would align the insurance com-
pany/customer gains with the social gains so that they would rationally switch premiums
if the gains exceeded transaction costs. As we have pointed out previously, the premium
tax could be most e¢ciently implemented in a no-fault system, because then competitive
insurance premiums would re‡ect only the frequency of accidents and not the share of ac-
cident damages borne, so that the optimal taxes would not depend upon whether one was
a good or bad driver.
A …nal possibility, which the government might help initiate and certify, but could be
privately run, would be to meter miles at the pump. This would marry per-mile premiums
with the pay-at-the-pump idea, getting the bene…ts of both. Insurance companies could
continue to compete much as they do now, but they would quote risk-classi…ed premiums
on a per-mile basis instead of a per-year basis. The per-mile premium for a car could be
converted to a per-gallon premium via multiplying by the car’s fuel e¢ciency (in miles per
gallon). Unlike uniform per-gallon premiums, these premiums could vary with a driver’s
risk characteristics. The driver would be issued an insurance card that would need to be
used when buying gasoline. The card might double as a credit card so that it could be used
in the electronic card readers that are currently at most pumps. The number of gallons
purchased could be sent electronically to a clearinghouse that reported this number to the
insurance company for billing. This system would have the advantage over uniform per-
gallon premiums that the price of driving would vary with the risk characteristics of an
individual and the territory where the individual lives, but not with the fuel e¢ciency of
the car the individual drives. It would borrow the advantage of pay-at-the-pump proposals
that evading premiums would be di¢cult because you could not purchase gasoline without49
buying insurance (whether the insurance is bought on credit or otherwise). This system
would also eliminate the need for regular odometer checks and the potential problem of
odometer fraud. The di¢culty with charging non-uniform per-gallon premiums is arbitrage.
One person could use another’s insurance card or his own card for another vehicle. Such
insurance fraud could be limited, however, by checking odometers when a claim is made. If
there is a substantial mismatch between the odometer reading and the premiums paid on
gasoline, the claim could be denied or pro rated based upon the percentage of premiums
paid. The simple principle would be: if you don’t pay your insurance premiums, you haven’t
bought insurance.
6 Conclusions
In all three models, the bene…ts of per-mile premiums are quite large. Bene…ts reach $18
billion nationally, or over $100 per car even under the linear model, and are substantially
larger ($25-29 billion) under our preferred regression or calibration models. (The linear
model would be roughly accurate if individual elasticities of accidents with respect to miles
were not unity as we have assumed, but were .5, because then the total social elasticity
of accidents would be roughly unity as in a linear model, once one takes into account the
externalities from two vehicle accidents.)43
Most of the bene…ts, however, are externalities, which is surely one reason that insurance
companies have not adopted per-mile premiums on their own. This observation suggests
several policy interventions worth considering. States could work to reduce the monitoring
costs for insurance companies by reading odometers or certifying odometer checkers. An-
other approach would be to impose a tax on insurance premiums to account for accident
externalities. Such a tax would gather substantial revenue, perhaps $60-70 billion, and
would also speed the day when insurance companies charge per-mile premiums. Because
43Recall that Hu et al. [1998] estimates of individual elasticities were in this range, though we argue that
they were probably biased downward substantially.50
the tax would make drivers pay the full accident cost of their driving, it would provide
insurance companies and drivers the incentive to strike a contract that would economize on
these costs by giving drivers the incentive to drive less. Alternatively, the government could
use a carrot, sweetening the pot by providing insurance companies with …nancial incentives
that re‡ected gains from reducing accident, congestion, and pollution externalities.
Our estimates of the bene…ts of uniform per-gallon premiums suggest that they are sub-
stantially inferior to per-mile premiums (unless transaction costs are substantially reduced).
However, per-gallon premiums could be individually tailored at relatively low cost either
now or in the near future (per-mile premiums metered at the pump). Uniform per-gallon
premiums could be a highly attractive option in countries that do not have fully developed
insurance markets and where gasoline does not already carry high taxes.
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